

# 1 | Africa, Central and Southern



Across the region, an additional 6.4 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 than in 2023, with the largest increases in Malawi, Namibia and Zambia.

A strong 2023/24 El Niño caused multiple food crises in the region to deepen due to production shortfalls and a subsequent rise in food prices.

The continuation of armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo led to the highest number of IDPs in the region and the second highest among the 53 countries/territories with data in 2024.

Four countries with food crises in the region faced a nutrition crisis – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Madagascar and Mozambique – and all had areas in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4).

The outlook for 2025 is bleak. Sharply escalating conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in early 2025 is worsening its food crisis. The lingering impacts of El Niño combined with other weather extremes and macroeconomic instability will stifle recovery and sustain high levels of acute food insecurity in the region.

# Africa, Central and Southern

Central African Republic | Congo | Democratic Republic of the Congo | Eswatini | Lesotho | Madagascar | Malawi | Mozambique | Namibia | United Republic of Tanzania | Zambia | Zimbabwe

The El Niño-driven drought experienced by most countries in the region in early 2024 led to widespread water shortages, significant livestock losses and below-average harvests of staple crops, resulting in an increase in the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity in the region. Ongoing conflicts and economic shocks also contributed to worsening outcomes.

**56.0M** 

people or 25% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 in 12 countries with food crises.


**10.0M** 

forcibly displaced people in the 12 countries with food crises – consisting of 8.9 million IDPs and 1.1 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

**5.2M** 

acutely malnourished children in four of the 12 countries with food crises. Of them, 1.6 million suffered the most severe form of acute malnutrition.

MAP 1.1 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 12 countries, 2024 peak




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

 Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

The Government of Zimbabwe did not support this analysis.

Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Zimbabwe); WFP (CARI) (Congo).

FIG 1.1 Share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2024 peak



Share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3+ or equivalent  
Analysed population  
Population not analysed

The total population was analysed in all countries, except for Democratic Republic of the Congo (98%), Lesotho (68%), Madagascar (25%), Mozambique (61%), United Republic of Tanzania (12%), and Zambia (88%).

## How have the food crises in this region changed since 2023?

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased by 13 percent between 2023 and 2024, rising from 49.6 million to 56.0 million people.

This regional deterioration is partially explained by the addition of new areas in **Madagascar**, **Mozambique** and **Zambia**. Nonetheless, the overall severity of food crises in the region deepened, with five countries declaring states of emergency due to the intense drought and its impact on smallholder farmers who rely heavily on rainfed agriculture for their livelihoods.


At 25.6 million people, **Democratic Republic of the Congo** was the largest food crisis in the region in 2024 in terms of magnitude, but Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) conditions were most prevalent in **Central African Republic** and **Namibia**, where 41 percent of the analysed populations faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC, September 2024; IPC, November 2024).

Despite a doubling of the population analysed, the magnitude of the food crisis in **Zambia** exhibited the region's largest year-on-year increase in the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above, which nearly tripled from around 2 million in 2023 to 5.8 million in 2024 (IPC, October 2024).

The severity of food crises also worsened in **Lesotho**, **Malawi**, **Zambia** and **Zimbabwe** as well as among refugees in **Congo**. The percentage of refugees in the country facing high levels of acute food insecurity rose from 65 percent in 2023 to 76 percent in 2024.

However, food security outcomes in **Madagascar** improved due to a confluence of factors that included increased humanitarian and development assistance, with the prevalence of high levels of acute food insecurity falling from 36 percent in 2023 to 22 percent in 2024 (IPC, January 2025).

FIG. 1.2 Share of analysed populations by phase of acute food insecurity, 2024 peak



The Government of Zimbabwe did not support this analysis.

Source: IPC TWGs; FEWS NET (Zimbabwe); WFP (CARI) (Congo).

## Severity of acute food insecurity

Ten of the 12 countries with food crises in Central and Southern Africa had IPC analyses with data disaggregated by phase of acute food insecurity. The WFP CARI and FEWS NET methodologies were used to classify the magnitude and severity of food crises in the Congo and Zimbabwe, respectively, and are therefore not included in this severity analysis.

 **5.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across ten countries.**

United Republic of Tanzania was the only country out of the ten with IPC analyses to have no populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in 2024. The total number of people in IPC Phase 4 varied from nearly 29 000 in **Lesotho** to 3.1 million in **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, with some food crises experiencing deteriorations while

others saw improvements. The most pronounced changes were recorded in **Eswatini**, **Malawi** and **Namibia**, where the number of people in this phase increased by more than 50 percent. By contrast, **Central African Republic**, **Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **Madagascar** all experienced decreases in the number of people in IPC Phase 4.

In 2024, **Mozambique** and **Zambia** continued to have high numbers of people in this phase. Comparing the 2023 and 2024 numbers is challenging, however, as new areas were covered in both countries' IPC analyses due to a heightened risk of acute food insecurity from El Niño. In contrast, the analysis in **United Republic of Tanzania** covered fewer districts and the number of people in IPC Phase 4 declined.

The share of analysed population in IPC Phase 4 ranged from 1 percent in **Zambia** to as high as 8 percent in **Central African Republic**.

### 43.6 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across ten countries.

The number of people across the region in IPC Phase 3 increased from 37.9 million in 2023 to 43.6 million in 2024, highlighting a significant deterioration in acute food insecurity.

The largest country increase was recorded in **Namibia**, where the number of people in this phase doubled from 0.6 million in 2023 to around 1.2 million in 2024. The food crisis in **Malawi** had the second-largest increase, with an additional 1.3 million. An improvement was noted in **Madagascar**, with the number of people in this phase declining from 2.2 million in 2023 to 1.7 million in 2024.

Despite increased geographic coverage in the analyses in **Mozambique** and **Zambia**, a rise in the number of people in IPC Phase 3 was recorded in both countries. The increase was particularly

sharp in **Zambia**, where the number of people in this phase nearly tripled from 2 million in 2023 to 5.6 million in 2024, and the prevalence of these outcomes among the analysed population rose from 23 percent to 32 percent.

In **United Republic of Tanzania**, it was difficult to determine how weather extremes and economic shocks in 2024 affected the food crisis, as the population analysed declined from 10.5 million people across 28 districts to 7.1 million people in 21 districts, yet the share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 increased from 10 percent to 13 percent compared with the previous peak.

### 81.5 million people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across ten countries.

The increase in the number of people in IPC Phase 2 by around 9.1 million highlights the precarious position of many in the region throughout 2024, as they had less capacity to cope with additional shocks.

The rise in the number of people in this phase in **Central African Republic**, **Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **Madagascar** alongside decreases in IPC Phase 3 and IPC Phase 4 suggests that there were modest improvements in these protracted food crises during 2024. However, these gains remain fragile, as any escalation of conflict in Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo or reduction in humanitarian and development aid could quickly reverse progress.

The number of people in None/Minimal (IPC Phase 1) in **Eswatini**, **Lesotho** and **Namibia** declined alongside concomitant increases in the numbers in the more severe phases of acute food insecurity, indicating deteriorating situations.

## Drivers of food crises in the region, 2024



**Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a total of 28.1 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**

Ongoing armed conflicts in parts of **Central African Republic** and **Democratic Republic of the Congo** drove high levels of acute food insecurity by limiting agricultural production, disrupting livelihoods, and constraining access to markets and humanitarian aid. These conflicts also continued to displace thousands of people, and in the case of **Central African Republic** there was an increase in the numbers of both returnees and Sudanese refugees fleeing that country's conflict.

In **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, hostilities in the western part of the country escalated during the first half of 2024 due to a failed peace agreement between two communities, resulting in damage to critical infrastructure, forced displacement and higher levels of acute food insecurity (ACAPS, December 2024).

In December 2024, a ceasefire agreement between the national government and armed non-state actor groups collapsed, leading to an escalation in the hostilities in the eastern part of the country, particularly in the city of Goma. This latest upsurge has exacerbated an already dire humanitarian situation, as civilian casualties, damage to critical infrastructure and disruptions to humanitarian aid have led to mass displacement (ACAPS, February 2025). Displacement sites on the outskirts of Goma that sheltered over 300 000 people were partially or completely emptied (IOM, January 2025).

There was a significant increase in the number of asylum-seekers crossing into Burundi, with close to 63 000 new arrivals in need of international protection recorded as of March (UNHCR, March 2025).



**Weather extremes were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in nine countries, where 27.6 million people experienced high levels of acute food insecurity, with Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe the worst affected.**

The 2023/24 El Niño is shaping up to be one of the most significant regional climatic events of the past decade, drawing comparisons to the devastating 2015/16 El Niño (OCHA, September 2024). However, the socioeconomic impacts of the 2023/24 El Niño event were more pronounced given that the capacity to respond was already badly eroded by the successive shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

The 2023/24 El Niño was characterized by the late onset of rains, prolonged mid-season dry spells and high temperatures driving very high levels of acute food insecurity in parts of **Madagascar**, **Malawi**, **Mozambique**, **Namibia**, **Zambia** and **Zimbabwe**. These weather conditions were at their peak in February 2024, which was the region's driest month in a century (OCHA, September 2024).

The severity of the drought not only led to widespread crop failures but also poor vegetation conditions for livestock in areas of **Namibia** and **Zambia**, where they are an important livelihood asset. There was also an increase in pests and crop diseases, such as locusts and cassava brown streak virus, due to the dry conditions. In **Lesotho**, **Malawi**, **Namibia**, **Zambia** and **Zimbabwe**, where governments declared states of emergency during the first half of 2024, the damage to crops and livestock led to rising numbers of people facing IPC Phase 3 or above.

In other areas, including in **Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **United Republic of Tanzania**, atypically heavy rains led to flooding (OCHA, September 2024), and, unlike with the 2015/16 El Niño, there were three cyclones that all left significant damage in their wake.

In particular, the Government of **Madagascar** declared a national disaster due to Tropical Cyclone Gamane that made landfall in the Sava,

Analanjirofo and Diana regions in the north and northeast of the country in April 2024. According to an assessment conducted by humanitarian partners and the country's National Office for Risk and Disaster Management, about 535 000 people living in the 33 flooded communes were affected, including 22 000 people who were displaced, most to temporary sites.

In **Malawi**, floods in March 2024 caused extensive damage to infrastructure, agricultural assets, food stocks and housing, affecting more than 156 000 people and displacing more than 18 000 in the east of the country. In addition, torrential rains caused by Tropical Storm Filipo hit **Mozambique** in March 2024, affecting more than 149 000 people in the provinces of Maputo, Sofala, Inhambane and Gaza (OCHA, September 2024).

The extent of damage caused by these weather extremes to the region's agriculture sector during the first half of 2024 meant that many households that relied on rainfed agriculture for subsistence and livelihoods were left with low food stores at the start of the lean season later in the year. Many were therefore market dependent at a time when food prices were rising due to regional production shortfalls and weak currencies.



**Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Eswatini, where 0.3 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.**


While economic shocks were only identified as a primary driver in **Eswatini**, they were considered a secondary driver in eight countries and a tertiary driver in the remaining three.

The drought-induced declines in agricultural production across much of the region led to national shortfalls of staple crops, particularly maize, putting upward pressure on food prices. They also increased countries' demand for costly imports. For instance, the price of yellow and white maize reached record highs in South Africa, a key supplier of cereals to countries in the region. As imports, these elevated prices filtered through to domestic markets, adding additional inflationary

pressures (FAO, November 2024). Sharp currency devaluations in **Malawi**, **Zambia** and **Zimbabwe** also contributed to rising costs of imports of food and inputs.

Historical data show that after a drought almost all countries experience a short-lived increase in inflationary pressures due to spikes in both energy and non-fuel commodity prices (IMF, April 2015). However, **Eswatini** – a net food-importing country – was particularly affected by this price shock in January 2024. The drought-related upward pressure on prices is projected to last through the first half of 2025. Some countries recorded new highs at the start of 2025. In **Malawi**, for example, the national average price of maize grain posted one of the steepest month-on-month gains over the last ten-year period in January 2025, rising by 29 percent (FAO, February 2025).


**FIG. 1.3 Highest food inflation rates, 2024 (compared with same month in 2023)**



There was no 2024 food inflation data available for the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo. For Zimbabwe, year-on-year inflation data in its new currency (ZLG) will only be computed starting in April 2025.

Sources: National Statistical Office of Malawi; Central Statistical Office of Zambia; Lesotho Bureau of Statistics; Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Mozambique; Institut National de la Statistique de Madagascar; Namibia Statistics Agency; Central Statistics Office of Eswatini; National Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania.

**FIG. 1.4 Number and share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in countries with food crises, 2016–2024**



Source: GRFC 2017–2025.

## Acute food insecurity since 2016

Since 2019, the magnitude and severity of the region's food crises have increased year-on-year, reflecting the negative impacts of recurrent, mutually reinforcing shocks.

This steady rise in numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity also reflects increases in populations analysed in **Central African Republic**, **Congo**, **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, **Eswatini**, **Madagascar**, **Namibia** and **Zimbabwe**. The most notable increase occurred in **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, where the analysis coverage rose from an average of 65 percent of the population between 2018 and 2020 to over 90 percent from 2021 to 2024.

Nine countries have protracted food crises – **Central African Republic**, **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, **Eswatini**, **Lesotho**, **Madagascar**, **Malawi**, **Mozambique**, **Zambia** and **Zimbabwe** – having had data for all editions of the GRFC.

The protracted nature of these food crises has primarily been driven by weather extremes, but conflict and insecurity in **Central African Republic**, **Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **Mozambique** have consistently given rise to the highest numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the region.

Economic shocks have been the dominant factor sustaining food crises in **Eswatini**, **Lesotho** and **Zimbabwe**. All three countries rely on food imports, including staple grains like maize and wheat, to meet national consumption needs and address food deficits. This dependency is further exacerbated during periods of poor harvests and economic instability.

**Angola** has been included in all editions of the GRFC except for this year's report due to a change in selection criteria. **United Republic of Tanzania** was included in all editions of the report except for the GRFC 2019 due to data not meeting GRFC technical requirements. Issues of data availability

from 2016 to 2022 hindered full analyses of the food crisis in **Congo**, despite the country being selected for inclusion. The GRFC 2023 was the first time that its data met GRFC technical requirements.

## Structural vulnerabilities underlie persistently high levels of acute food insecurity

In addition to the drivers of high levels of acute food insecurity in the region, structural vulnerabilities challenge recovery from shocks and can entrench acute food insecurity, supporting conditions for the protracted food crises across much of the Central and Southern Africa region.

Poverty, climate change and high reliance on an underdeveloped agriculture sector for employment underpin the recurrence of food crises.

Countries with food crises in this region generally rank low on the Human Development Index (HDI), reflecting widespread poverty, limited access to education and inadequate healthcare systems.

**Central African Republic** and **Democratic Republic of the Congo** consistently fall among the lowest globally in HDI rankings, highlighting deep structural challenges (UNDP, 2024).

According to the INFORM Risk Index, these countries also face high exposure to hazards, lack of coping capacity, and vulnerability, with countries like the **Central African Republic** and **Mozambique** ranking as "extremely high" risk (EJRC, July 2024).

Agricultural, forestry and fishery employment accounts for a significant share of livelihoods, ranging from 60 to 80 percent in several countries, making populations heavily reliant on rainfed agriculture. This dependence leaves them highly vulnerable to climate variability, including droughts that regularly shorten the crop-growing period, as seen in **Madagascar**, **Malawi** and **Zimbabwe**.

High reliance on food imports further exposes countries to global price volatility, making food access more uncertain and often worsening food insecurity. For instance, **Eswatini**, **Lesotho**, **Mozambique**, **Namibia** and **Congo** rely on imports for more than 50 percent of their cereal needs.

FIG. 1.5 Selected structural vulnerability indicators by country

	Annual population growth: UNDESA for population (%)	Cereal import dependency ratio (%)	Crop-growing period affected by drought conditions (%)	HDI global ranking (1-192)	INFORM Risk (0-10)	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	3.4		11.8	191	8.1	70.8
CONGO	2.4	88.9	8.7	149	4.4	32.3
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	3.3	23.0	6.5	180	8.0	56.1
ESWATINI	0.9	65.1	12.0	142	3.3	13.4
LESOTHO	1.1	81.9	18.6	168	3.7	29.4
MADAGASCAR	2.5	22.1	12.3	177	5.1	70.0
MALAWI	2.6	2.2	12.6	172	4.3	62.1
MOZAMBIQUE	2.9	50.7	13.2	183	6.9	70.1
NAMIBIA	2.4	75.2	19.7	142	4.0	21.6
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	2.9	-0.9	17.6	167	4.3	65.5
ZAMBIA	2.8	-9.8	16.7	153	4.0	57.3
ZIMBABWE	1.7	33.5	20.1	159	4.4	52.6

For descriptions of these indicators see Technical notes, page 170.

Sources: UNDESA (Annual population growth); FAO (Cereal import dependency ratio); EC-JRC (Crop-growing period affected by drought condition); UNDP (HDI Global Index); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment).

## Acute food insecurity outlook 2025

**In the ten countries with available analyses, early 2025 projections suggest that the high levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist, with 56.2 million people or 26.4 percent of the analysed population projected to face IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent.**

The escalation of the conflict in eastern **Democratic Republic of the Congo** since the end of 2024 culminated in armed groups seizing the provincial capitals of Goma in North Kivu and Bukavu in South Kivu, exacerbating the country's food crisis. In the four provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika, an additional 2.2 million people are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the first half of 2025 compared with the 2024 peak (July–December), bringing the total to 27.7 million or 24 percent of

the analysed population. The number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is projected to increase from just over 3.1 million to nearly 3.9 million. Out of the 3.7 million IDPs analysed, more than 2.2 million (or 61 percent of them) are projected to face IPC Phase 3 or above, with over 738 000 in IPC Phase 4 (IPC, March 2025).

The escalating conflict has caused massive population movements, including new displacements as well as forced returns following the abrupt closure of IDP sites in January. IDPs either had to return to their areas of origin or to live with host families, heightening the economic vulnerabilities of both population groups.

The cost of basic food items and essential imported goods has risen, which, combined with limited access to livelihoods, is severely curtailing people's access to food (IPC, March 2025).

After the intense drought brought on by El Niño during the first half of 2024, many countries in Central and Southern Africa continued to experience below-average rainfall and high temperatures through the end of the year, resulting in drier-than-normal conditions in eastern **Madagascar**, southern **Mozambique**, southern **Namibia**, southern **Zambia** and western **Zimbabwe** (WFP, December 2024). This early-season dryness delayed the onset of the growing season and negatively impacted early crop development in key cereal-producing regions.

However, in January 2025 a weak La Niña brought rainfall to the region and is expected to produce favourable weather conditions for crop production through April 2025, which will help recovery by boosting crop production during the agricultural season and improving the availability of income from seasonal agricultural labour. Nonetheless, 2025 cereal production expectations are at near-average levels (FAO, March 2025).

Widespread rainfall supported replanting efforts and vegetation growth in most of Southern Africa in early 2025 (WFP, April 2025). However, excessive rainfall caused localized flooding in northern **Namibia**, **Zambia**, **Zimbabwe**, southern **Malawi**, and western and northern **Mozambique** in February and March 2025 (NOAA, March 2025). While the overall seasonal outlook remains more favourable than the previous year, production is estimated to remain average to slightly below-average (WFP, April 2025).

**Madagascar**, **Malawi** and **Mozambique** are likely to continue facing threats from an abnormally active 2024–2025 tropical cyclone season due to warmer ocean temperatures. By early March 2025, five tropical cyclones and three tropical storms had already passed through the three countries, leading to heavy rains, high winds and flooding that caused significant damage to houses and agricultural land (WFP, March 2025).

Even before the global economic uncertainty generated by the imposition and posturing of tariffs, the short-term economic outlook for the region projected a sluggish recovery from

the weather extremes in most countries amid ongoing macroeconomic tightening and high debt levels. This context exacerbates macroeconomic vulnerabilities within countries, as they are more likely to experience currency depreciations and, in turn, domestic inflationary pressure (IMF, October 2024).

A 2025 alert has already been raised for the local official currency in **Zimbabwe**, as it depreciated significantly against the US dollar (WFP, January 2025). In a worst-case scenario, an additional 1 million people were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in the country from January–March 2025 bringing the total to 6 million compared with 5 million in the last three months of 2024 (FEWS NET, October 2024).

In **Mozambique**, the probable expansion of the contested areas into the traditionally less-affected areas of Cabo Delgado province is expected to exacerbate current access and displacement issues, resulting in a further deterioration of acute food insecurity (WFP and FAO, November 2024).

Despite a slight projected improvement in the acute food insecurity situation in **Central African Republic** in 2025, conflict and insecurity will remain the primary driver of the country's widespread food crisis.

## ACUTE MALNUTRITION | Four out of 12 countries with food crises in the region also faced a nutrition crisis.

All four countries with a nutrition crisis – **Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and Mozambique** – had areas in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4), reaching 10 percent of the analysed areas in **Central African Republic and Madagascar** (Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est regions). About 80 percent of analysed areas in these two countries were in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3), highlighting the widespread nature of the nutrition crises.

While the nutrition crisis in **Madagascar** deteriorated since 2023, in **Central African Republic** the situation improved with fewer areas classified in IPC AMN Phases 3 and 4.

High severity of acute malnutrition was less widespread in **Democratic Republic of the Congo** (about 2 percent of areas in IPC AMN Phase 4 and 11 percent in IPC AMN Phase 3), which saw an improvement in the July–December low season for acute malnutrition compared with the same period the previous year (IPC, November 2023; September 2024).

In **Mozambique**, where about 2 percent of analysed areas were in IPC AMN Phase 4 and 8 percent in IPC AMN Phase 3, the classification improved markedly in the Palma district of Cabo Delgado – from Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in 2023 to Acceptable (IPC AMN Phase 1) in 2024.

FIG. 1.6 Number of children aged 6–59 months with acute malnutrition in four countries, 2024




FIG. 1.8 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in the four countries, 2024

Sources: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2023; Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, September 2024; Madagascar IPC TWG, January 2024; Mozambique IPC TWG, August 2024.

## Acute malnutrition trends, 2020–2024

Areas of **Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar** have had a persistently high GAM prevalence.

Between 2018 and 2022, southern **Madagascar** experienced drought that led to Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) levels of acute food insecurity in 2021. In Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est regions, the prevalence of acute malnutrition in some areas reached 15 percent in 2020 and 26.3 percent in 2021, with Ambovombe district worst affected. Subsequently, the prevalence fell to 14 percent in 2022 and just below 10 percent in 2024.

Since 2020 in **Central African Republic** and 2021 in **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, IPC AMN analyses have consistently classified areas in IPC AMN Phase 4.

Nationally, acute malnutrition prevalence in **Mozambique** was low at 4.5 percent in 2019–2020 (INE, October 2021). Yet localized conflict, population displacement and climate shocks resulted in subnational spikes, particularly in Cabo Delgado (IPC, June 2021).

## Main contributing factors to nutrition crises, 2024

### Basic causes

Persistent conflict, insecurity and population displacement contributed to high levels of acute malnutrition in **Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo** and northern **Mozambique**. In **Central African Republic**, the refugee influx from the Sudan put additional pressure on already weak basic services. Limited humanitarian access hampered humanitarian response. Reduced humanitarian funding limited assistance levels in **Central African Republic** and **Mozambique** (HNRN, December 2024).

Mpox outbreaks affected **Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **Central African Republic**. In the former, the outbreak affected all provinces, particularly in displacement settings in North Kivu and South Kivu (MSF, August 2024). Children with acute malnutrition had a higher risk of a more severe mpox infection, while those with a severe infection were at a higher risk of becoming acutely malnourished. The situation created nutrition-specific programming challenges, as adjusted guidance was required, particularly relating to breastfeeding (UNICEF, November 2024).

### Underlying and immediate causes

Among the four nutrition crises, **Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **Madagascar** (Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est regions) exhibited “very high” acute malnutrition risk factors across food, health, and care and services pathways, indicating the multiplicity of nutritional vulnerabilities. **Central African Republic** had “very high” risk factors in two pathways (food, and care and services). In **Mozambique**, only “very high” risk factors were observed across the health pathway, but a lack of routine data on the quantity and quality of diets limited insights on the food pathway.

A low proportion of children aged 6–23 months consuming a minimum acceptable diet, a higher

FIG. 1.7 Number of children aged 6–59 months with acute malnutrition, 2024





FIG. 1.8 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2024



Sources: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2023; Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, September 2024; Madagascar IPC TWG, January 2024; Mozambique IPC TWG, August 2024.

proportion of children suffering from diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections than in previous years, and a low proportion of households with access to safe drinking water were all “very high” risk factors in three nutrition crises in the region.

## 2025 outlook

Even before the escalation of conflict in late 2024–early 2025 in **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, the IPC analysis had projected a deterioration in January–June 2025, the high season for acute malnutrition (IPC, September 2024).


An improvement is expected in **Madagascar** through August 2025, with no areas classified in IPC AMN Phase 4 (IPC, November 2024). The situation in **Mozambique** was expected to remain similar until March 2025 (IPC, August 2024). There is no IPC AMN 2025 projection available for **Central African Republic**.

## DISPLACEMENT | The number of forcibly displaced people in Central and Southern Africa has increased sharply over the past nine years, driven by prolonged conflicts and increasing frequency of climate shocks.

Despite temporary decreases in displacement in some parts of the region, the overall trend indicates growing needs for coordinated humanitarian responses to mitigate acute food insecurity and protect displaced populations.

At the end of 2024, 10 million people were forcibly displaced in the 12 countries with food crises, with 83 percent of them internally displaced in **Democratic Republic of the Congo**. The ongoing armed conflict in the eastern provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri, in addition to insecurity, flooding and landslides in other provinces, has created a large-scale protracted displacement crisis where the vast majority of the country's 7.8 million IDPs were concentrated (OCHA, December 2024). In addition, over 520 000 refugees and asylum-seekers were hosted in **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, principally from **Central African Republic, Rwanda and South Sudan**.

**FIG 1.9** Total number of forcibly displaced people in countries with food crises, 2024



Source: UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2024, IOM.

In **Mozambique**, escalating attacks in Cabo Delgado continued to drive forced displacement, compounded by Cyclone Freddy's devastating impact (IOM, March 2024). As of December 2024, there were almost 750 000 forcibly displaced people in Mozambique, including roughly 24 000 refugees and asylum-seekers from **Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Rwanda**.

Insecurity continued to drive displacement in **Central African Republic** (UNHCR, January 2025). There were just over 450 000 forcibly displaced people throughout the country in December 2024, including over 53 000 refugees and asylum-seekers. In addition to the large influx of Sudanese refugees, the number of IDPs returning to their areas of origin increased notably following temporary security improvements. However, returnees often encountered destroyed infrastructure, lack of basic services and ongoing insecurity, limiting sustainable reintegration (UNHCR, January 2025).

## Acute food insecurity among displaced populations

Disaggregated acute food insecurity data are only available for IDPs in **Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **Mozambique**. In conflict-affected areas of **Democratic Republic of the Congo** (Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu), over 2.1 million IDPs were projected in IPC Phase 3 or above from June to December 2024, including 702 000 people in IPC Phase 4 (IPC, October 2024).

In Cabo Delgado in **Mozambique**, an estimated 171 000 IDPs, or 46 percent of the analysed IDP population, were projected to experience high levels of acute food insecurity from October 2024 to March 2025 (IPC, August 2024).

**FIG 1.10** Total number of forcibly displaced people in countries with food crises, 2013–2024




Sources: 2013–2023: UNHCR, IDMC.  
2024: UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2024, IOM.

## Acute malnutrition among displaced populations

The only available data on acute malnutrition among displaced populations are for refugees in Dzaleka camp near Lilongwe in **Malawi**. A 2022 SENS survey reported a low GAM prevalence of around 4.5 percent. However, recent admission data indicate that the number of children aged 6–59 months with MAM more than doubled between October 2023 and October 2024, linked to food insecurity caused by the El Niño-induced drought (WFP, December 2024).

**MAP 1.2** Number of forcibly displaced people by country, December 2024



IDPs

Refugees and asylum-seekers


Source: UNHCR nowcasted estimates December 2024, IOM.

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Conflict and insecurity, macroeconomic instability and erratic rainfall continued to drive widespread acute food insecurity.

### PEAK 2024 (APRIL–AUGUST)

 **2.5M** people or 41% of the total population experienced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, over **0.5M** people faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This a slight decrease compared with the 2023 peak of 2.7 million people (44 percent of the population analysed). Eleven subprefectures were classified in IPC Phase 4 and 59 in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) out of the 72 analysed.




Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG, June 2024.

### PROJECTION 2025 (APRIL–AUGUST)

 **2.3M** people or 35% of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, **0.4M** people are projected to face IPC Phase 4.

This a slight improvement compared with the 2024 peak under the assumption of increased assistance. Eight sub-prefectures are projected to be in IPC Phase 4.



Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2024.

 At least 25% of households meet 25–50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

 At least 25% of households meet >50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

### DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

#### Conflict/insecurity

Persistent localized conflict and insecurity disrupted agricultural production, income-generating activities and markets, particularly in the east, putting upward pressure on food prices. Displaced and remote populations, and market-dependent households in poor urban or peri-urban areas, could only cover food needs using coping mechanisms such as selling productive assets (FEWS NET, October 2024).

Clashes between national forces and armed groups, or related to

#### DISPLACEMENT

 **0.05M** refugees and asylum-seekers

UNHCR *Nowcasted estimates, December 2024.*

 **0.4M** IDPs

IOM, *September 2024.*

transhumance, have led to internal displacement. The persistence of armed conflict and cross-border crises risks an increase in population displacements (IPC, November 2024).

 **Economic shocks** Low agricultural production increased the country's reliance on imported goods, while high fuel prices increased import costs and hindered transport, trade and humanitarian aid (FEWS NET, October 2024).

 **Weather extremes** By September 2024, rainfall was below the 30-year average except in the north and northeast. Dry conditions reduced agricultural yields and limited pasture, reducing milk production and leading to poor body conditions. Flooding damaged croplands in Vakaga, Haute-Kotto and Mbomou (IPC, November 2024).

## Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025




Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG.

**A protracted food crisis** A low-income country, the Central African Republic has been deeply affected by internal conflicts and insecurity since 2013, with long-lasting consequences on food availability and access. The country has consistently been among the ten countries with the highest prevalence of high levels of acute food insecurity, reaching 51 percent at the height of COVID-19 restrictions in May–August 2020.

## NUTRITION CRISIS | Insecurity, acute food insecurity and limited health and nutrition services underpin this nutrition crisis.

### PEAK 2024 (MARCH–AUGUST)

Out of 70 areas analysed, 56 were in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above). Six sub-prefectures and Birao refugee camp were classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4). Compared to 2023, overall severity decreased but the number of areas in IPC AMN Phase 3 increased from 36 to 49.



Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2023.

### ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (SEPTEMBER 2023–AUGUST 2024)

 **0.2M** children aged 6–59 months

0.1M MAM 0.05M SAM

Source: Central African Republic IPC TWG, November 2023.

 **0.2M** pregnant and breastfeeding women

### CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Fewer than 10 percent of children aged 6–23 months consumed a minimum acceptable diet in areas classified in IPC AMN Phase 4. Exclusive breastfeeding rates were suboptimal in some areas, such as Ouaka prefecture (46 percent) (IPC, November 2023).

Poor access to safe drinking water (10 percent in Vakaga) and improved sanitation facilities (3 percent in Ouaka) contributed to disease outbreaks, aggravated by seasonal rains from July to September in the North. Malaria, acute respiratory infections and diarrhoea persisted, with prevalence rates of up to 70 percent. There was a measles outbreak in Kouï (IPC, November 2023). The mpox outbreak put

additional pressure on the health system (ECDC, August 2024).

Insecurity and a fragile health system limited access to healthcare, with low measles vaccination coverage (24 percent in Ouaka prefecture). Humanitarian operations were difficult due to insecurity in the north and southeast and underfunding (a third less than 2023), particularly for nutrition (UN, December 2024). In Birao, the refugee and returnee influx from the Sudan put additional pressure on health and nutrition services (UN, November 2024).

Insecurity hindered collection of up-to-date health and nutrition data, leading to reliance on historical data for many areas (IPC, November 2023).



## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Conflict and macroeconomic instability continue to drive high levels of acute food insecurity.


### PEAK 2024 (JULY–DECEMBER)

**25.6M** people or 22% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Of them, **2.1M** were IDPs.

In total, **3.1M** people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Considering the overlapping regions analysed between the 2023 and 2024 peaks, this is a slight improvement. The eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika and Maindombe, where most IDPs are concentrated, were of highest concern.



Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, October 2024.


### PROJECTION 2025 (JANUARY–JUNE)\*

**27.7M** or 24% of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.

Of them, **2.2M** are IDPs.

In total, **3.9M** people are projected in IPC Phase 4.

Escalating conflict in the eastern part of the country has exacerbated the food crisis, with the situation deteriorating in the four provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika.



\* The projection period differs from the period defined as peak in 2024.

Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, March 2025.

## DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

**Conflict/insecurity** Despite the July 2024 peace treaty, attacks and clashes continued in the northeastern areas, particularly in North Kivu (IOM, October 2024). As a result, the June 2024 and January 2025 harvests were expected to be below average, which drove up food prices and market dependence, hindering households' access to food (FEWS NET, June 2024).

Displaced households have not had access to their fields and only rare opportunities for temporary agricultural labour. Most of these households had very limited food stocks and relied on assistance or the market for their food supplies (IPC, October 2024).

Hostilities continued through early 2025, increasing displacement and

humanitarian assistance needs (OCHA, May 2025).

**Economic shocks** Local currency depreciation continued to drive up prices of imported foodstuffs, such as maize flour and cassava, as well as agricultural inputs. Poor roads and transport complicated the flow of products to markets and supply of inputs. High fuel costs also exacerbated households' purchasing power (IPC, October 2024).

## DISPLACEMENT

**0.5M** refugees and asylum-seekers **7.8M** IDPs


Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

Source: OCHA, December 2024.

## NUTRITION CRISIS | Although severity has decreased since the previous analysis of early 2023, deterioration is expected in 2025.

### PEAK 2024 (JULY–DECEMBER)

Out of 358 areas analysed, 49 were in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) and eight in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4). Changes in coverage in 2024 hinder comparability, but the situation appeared better than previous years.



Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, September 2024.

### ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (JULY 2024–JUNE 2025)

**4.5M** children aged 6–59 months

3.1M MAM 1.4M SAM

Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG, September 2024.

**3.7M** pregnant and breastfeeding women

## CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Inadequate access to nutritious foods remained widespread. Only 5–40 percent of 6–23-month-old children achieved minimum dietary diversity. Exclusive breastfeeding rates were suboptimal, especially in Haut-Lomami and Kwilu provinces (38.4 percent) (IPC, September 2024).

Measles, cholera and mpox outbreaks put additional pressure on the health system (IPC, September 2024; WHO, January 2025). Mpox spread rapidly, with nearly 26 000 cases in children by November and high transmission rates among IDPs in crowded conditions (ACAPS, September 2024). Acute respiratory infections and malaria were endemic among children under 5 years.

Water and sanitation infrastructure was insufficient nationwide, with most households lacking improved latrines in 25 out of the 26 provinces. In 18 provinces, less than 50 percent of the population had access to improved drinking water sources (IPC, September 2024).

Healthcare coverage was low in Mai-Ndombe and Sankuru provinces, due to their remoteness and conflict (IPC, September 2024). In conflict-affected eastern provinces, displaced populations faced precarious living conditions, with intermittent insecurity limiting the humanitarian aid on which they rely (UN, June 2024; IOM, July 2024).

## Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025



Source: Democratic Republic of the Congo IPC TWG.

**A protracted food crisis** The country has been among the ten countries/territories with the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in all editions of the GRFC, reflecting the humanitarian impact of more than three decades of conflict and insecurity. The population analysed significantly increased from 2021, as did the number of people estimated to be facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).

1 - None/Minimal 1+2 - None/Minimal and Stressed 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine IDPs/other settlements classification

At least 25% of households meet >50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Flooding contributed to sustained high levels of acute food insecurity.

### Residents

AUGUST-DECEMBER 2023 (NO 2024 DATA AVAILABLE)

 **1.8M** people or 31% of the analysed population experienced high levels of acute food insecurity during the last quarter of 2023.

Of them, **0.02M** were facing severe acute food insecurity. In five departments, more than half of households experienced high levels of acute food insecurity: Lékomou (63%), Kouilou (60%), Cuvette Ouest (57%), Likouala (56%) and Pool (52%).

Source: WFP (CARI), 2023.

### DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2023-2024

 **Weather extremes** Between October 2023 and January 2024, heavy rains resulted in the worst flooding of the Congo River Basin in over 50 years, affecting nine out of the country's 12 departments (ACAPS, January 2024).

The impact of this extreme weather led the government to declare a state of emergency in the Likouala, Sangha, Cuvette, Plateaux, Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville departments (WFP, December 2023), as the floods affected more than 1.8 million people and left more than 350 000 people in need of humanitarian assistance (UN, January 2024).

There was localized acute food insecurity in the eastern part of the country, where an estimated 2 300 hectares of croplands were inundated, leading to crop losses and reduced food availability (FAO, November 2024). In addition, access to pastures was limited and productive assets, such as cattle and canoes, were washed away (IFRC, January 2024).

 **Economic shocks** In 2023, the government enacted gradual fuel subsidy reforms that led to a 30 percent increase in the price of gas and diesel (IMF, July 2024) and a concomitant increase in transportation and food costs (WB, August 2024).

### Refugees

JULY 2023 (NO 2024 DATA AVAILABLE)

 **0.2M** people or 76% of the analysed refugee population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Over the past year, there has been an influx of refugees in Congo from the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo, and they have settled primarily in the Likouala and Plateaux departments, which were badly affected by the 2023/24 floods. Host communities faced pre-existing food shortages and limited livelihood opportunities, which meant that refugees' food security relied heavily on ongoing humanitarian assistance.


# Eswatini

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) has more than doubled since 2023.

PEAK 2024/25 (OCTOBER 2024-MARCH 2025)

 **0.3M** people or 25% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around **0.03M** faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Elevated food prices and reduced incomes, along with reduced crop production due to adverse weather events, contributed to the number of people facing IPC Phase 4 more than doubling, from 15 000 during the peak in 2023 to 34 000 in 2024.



Source: Eswatini IPC TWG, July 2024.

### Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016-2024/25



Source: Eswatini IPC TWG.

**A protracted food crisis** A lower-middle-income country, Eswatini has been in all editions of the GRFC. At least 24 percent of its population has faced high levels of acute food insecurity each year, mainly driven by economic shocks and weather extremes. High levels of acute food insecurity peaked during the COVID-19 pandemic, when 32 percent of the analysed population faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).

### DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2024-2025

 **Economic shocks** Food prices remained elevated, with maize meal prices increasing by 4.4 percent between June and August 2024 (FAO, October 2024). High prices in South Africa led to higher import costs for Eswatini, providing upward pressure on prices (FAO, October 2024). Slowing real GDP growth in 2025 will sustain high unemployment, impacting household income and food access (IMF, September 2024; IPC, July 2024).

 **Weather extremes** From January to March 2024, dry spells during the critical stages of plant growth caused crop failures. Household food stocks depleted earlier than usual, forcing households to rely on market purchases to cover food needs (IPC, July 2024).

The 2025 cropping season began late due to unfavourable weather conditions through November 2024. Since then, cumulative rainfall amounts were average with even temporal distribution, which is supporting cereal crop production and expectations for average to above-average maize yields in 2025 (FAO-GIEWS, February 2025).

### DISPLACEMENT

 **3 500** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.


1 - None/Minimal   2 - Stressed   3 - Crisis   4 - Emergency   5 - Catastrophe/Famine   Total population

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Prolonged dry spells and reduced household purchasing power led to slightly worse acute food insecurity outcomes.

### PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER–DECEMBER)

 **0.4M** people or 27% of the analysed rural population faced high levels of acute food insecurity at the start of the lean season.

Of them, around **0.03M** faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4), which represented an increase from the previous year. Households in the Maseru and Mafeteng districts experienced a larger deterioration than those in the other eight districts.




Source: IPC TWG Lesotho, August 2024.

### PROJECTION 2025 (JANUARY–MARCH)\*

 **0.3M** or 22% of the analysed rural population are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the height of the lean season.

Although the overall magnitude and severity of the food crisis are likely to decrease, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are projected to become widespread, with all districts being classified in a Crisis situation (IPC Phase 3). The most affected districts include Qacha's Nek, with 30 percent of its population in IPC Phase 3, followed by Mafeteng, Maseru and Mohale's Hoek at 25 percent each.



\* The projection period differs from the period defined as peak in 2024.

Source: IPC TWG Lesotho, February 2025.

### DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

#### Weather extremes

 El Niño-induced drought from December 2023 to March 2024 occurred during critical growth stages of crop production, contributing to the lowest crop yields since the 2018/19 agricultural season (IPC, August 2024; UN, September 2024). Many households depleted their food stocks atypically early in around July/August 2024, which left them market reliant at a time when their purchasing power was constrained by above-average staple food prices (FEWS NET, September 2024). Income from livestock sales and agricultural labour opportunities also declined, further exacerbating issues of financial access.

Cumulative rainfall amounts were below average at the start of the 2025 cropping season, which dampened expectations of recovery. However, La Niña conditions are forecasted to bring above-average rainfall amounts through May 2025, which could improve cereal yields in 2025 beyond current expectations (FAO-GIEWS, February 2025).

Prior to 2025, humanitarian assistance had supported improvements in the food security situation, but its decline is expected to cause vulnerable households to experience larger food gaps towards the end of the lean season (IPC, February 2025).


 **Economic shocks** Lesotho is typically a net-cereal importing country, but below-average harvests in 2024 increased the country's already high reliance on imports to cover domestic demand (FAO, November 2024). Maize meal prices, for example, remained 28 percent above the five-year average due to high import prices from South Africa as well as increasing fuel costs, which both increased inflationary pressures (WFP, 2024). High prices pushed households to resort to coping strategies such as selling productive assets to cover food costs, while elevated prices of seeds and fertilizers constrained their abilities to begin agricultural production (FEWS NET, August 2024).

### DISPLACEMENT

 **400** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

### Peak numbers (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025



Source: Lesotho IPC TWG.

**A protracted food crisis** Lesotho, a lower-middle-income country, has been in all editions of the GRFC, with widespread poverty and vulnerability to climate extremes underlying food insecurity. High levels of acute food insecurity peaked during the COVID-19 pandemic, with 40 percent of the analysed population facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October and March 2021. In 2024, El Niño-induced dry spells pushed population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) while no population in that Phase in 2023.





## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | El Niño-induced drought, macroeconomic instability and limited livelihood opportunities drove highest levels of acute food insecurity in seven years.

### PEAK 2024/2025 (OCTOBER 2024–MARCH 2025)

 **5.7M** people or 28% of the total population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around **0.4M** people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The magnitude and severity of the situation significantly worsened from the previous year's peak due to El Niño-related prolonged dry periods and large-scale crop losses, with the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity reaching the highest in GRFC history. Chikhwawa, Nsanje and Balaka districts had the highest percentage of affected populations, while several districts in the Central region were of high concern.



Source: Malawi IPC TWG, July 2024.

1 - None/Minimal   2 - Stressed   3 - Crisis   4 - Emergency   5 - Catastrophe/Famine

### DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

 **Weather extremes** While farmers in the Southern region were still recovering from the impacts of Tropical Cyclone Freddy that struck in early 2023, El Niño created prolonged dry spells during critical moments in crop development. It also led to lower amounts of rainfall that were unevenly distributed throughout the country (IPC, July 2024).

In March 2024, the President declared a state of disaster in 23 out of 28 districts due to the severity of the El Niño-induced drought conditions (OCHA, August 2024). The ensuing large-scale crop losses – with over 1 million hectares of cropped land affected during the 2023/24 season – exacerbated the country's already severe decline in staple crop production, particularly in the Southern region. Production of

maize – the main staple crop – was 29 percent below the recent five-year average. Several districts also reported production declines of key crops such as millet, sorghum and soybeans (FEWS NET, June 2024).

As a result of low production, national and household stocks were below average and depleted early into the lean season. Smallholder households became reliant on markets to meet their daily food needs at a time when food prices were rising and income-earning opportunities were limited given that most are agriculture-based (IPC, July 2024). La Niña weather conditions from October 2024 to March 2025 brought above-average rainfall to much of the country, which heightened the risk of flooding due to soil impermeability (WFP, October 2024).

 **Pests and diseases** The drought created favourable conditions for the multiplication of fall armyworm, which negatively affected over 700 000 hectares of crops (FEWS NET, October 2024). In January 2025, reported outbreaks of African armyworm and fall armyworm caused the Ministry of Agriculture to issue an alert to farmers. Despite the risk that these pests pose to crop production, mostly favourable weather conditions through April 2025 due to La Niña are expected to improve yields in 2025 (FAO-GIEWS, January 2025).

 **Economic shocks** Persistent macroeconomic instability continued to erode the purchasing power of very poor rural households and low-income urban households through increased food prices and


limited livelihood opportunities. In August 2024, food price inflation reached 42 percent (WFP, July 2024). This rise was primarily caused by domestic supply pressure stemming from a reduced national 2024 harvest (FAO-GIEWS, January 2025). Inflationary pressures were also exacerbated by a weak currency, which had lost 110 percent of its value by October 2024 (FEWS NET, October 2024).

### DISPLACEMENT

 **56 500** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

### Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024/25



Source: Malawi IPC TWG.

**A protracted food crisis** Malawi has been in all nine editions of the GRFC. From 2018, IPC analyses used to measure the magnitude and severity of the food crisis show that the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity has ranged from 2.5 million in 2020 to 5.7 million in 2024/25. This protracted food crisis has been primarily driven by weather extremes, as the country has experienced several years of dry weather conditions interspersed with severe tropical storms and cyclones.

Acute food insecurity is more pronounced in the Southern region, which is more prone to the negative impacts of weather extremes, particularly the districts of Balaka, Chikwawa and Nsanje, which have been regularly classified in IPC Phase 3.

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Drought and conflict contributed to high levels of acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2024/2025 (OCTOBER 2024–MARCH 2025)


 **4.9M** people or 24% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 105 of Mozambique's 156 districts during the lean season.

 Of them, **0.2M** were IDPs in Cabo Delgado.

In total, **0.9M** were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The increased coverage of the 2024 IPC analysis partially explains the year-on-year rise in the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse). However, reduced agricultural production from the El Niño-induced drought, flooding and high food prices also contributed to the persistence of high levels of acute food insecurity in central and southern regions. Poor outcomes in the north, particularly in Cabo Delgado, were driven by protracted conflict.

Source: Mozambique IPC TWG, January 2025.

### Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024/25




Source: Mozambique IPC TWG.

 1 - None/Minimal    2 - Stressed    3 - Crisis    4 - Emergency    5 - Catastrophe/Famine

 At least 25% of households meet >50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

## DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025



 **Weather extremes** The El Niño-induced drought brought rainfall shortages and above-average temperatures during the 2023–2024 agricultural season, resulting in sharp declines in production, as the country's agriculture sector is dominated by rainfed farming systems. This included a national shortfall of nearly 720 000 tonnes of maize (FAO, September 2024). Vulnerable households therefore depleted food stocks early and were market reliant at the start of the lean season (FEWS NET, October 2024).

Tropical Storm Filipo in March 2024 as well as Cyclone Chido in December 2024 damaged 30 000 and 28 000 hectares of cropland, respectively, in addition to critical infrastructure and livelihoods (FEWS NET, October 2024; OCHA, December 2024).

 **Conflict/insecurity** The protracted conflict in Cabo Delgado stabilized during the second half of 2024. However, small-scale intermittent attacks continued, hindering access to agricultural lands, disrupting markets and trade, and reducing food availability (FEWS NET, October 2024).

 **Economic shocks** Below-average supplies of staple foods continued to apply upward pressure on prices, reducing household purchasing power. In October 2024, maize prices remained 33 percent and 60 percent above the five-year average in the southern and central regions, respectively (FEWS NET, October 2024).

## DISPLACEMENT

 **0.02M** refugees and asylum-seekers    **0.7M** IDPs


Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

Source: IOM, July 2024.

## NUTRITION CRISIS | Poor diets and diseases drove acute malnutrition in some areas, especially those affected by conflict.

PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER 2024–MARCH 2025)

 Four out of 47 districts analysed were classified in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) in Nampula and central Zambézia provinces, up from three in 2023. Palma district in Cabo Delgado province saw a considerable improvement, from Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in 2023 to Acceptable (IPC AMN Phase 1) in 2024.



Source: Mozambique IPC TWG, August 2024.

## CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Children's diets continued to be critically poor, with fewer than 10 percent of 6–23-month-olds receiving a minimum acceptable diet. Only 13 percent of women in Zambézia and Nampula provinces met minimum dietary diversity. For IDPs reliant on humanitarian assistance, rations were reduced to 39 percent of calorific requirements every other month due to funding shortfalls (UN, December 2024).

In most districts, vaccination coverage was suboptimal (30–60 percent), as was vitamin A supplementation (13 percent in Nicudala). Good service coverage by humanitarian providers facilitated early case finding and treatment for acute malnutrition in Eriti district and Cabo Delgado province. However, insecurity limited humanitarian access in the north (NRC, October 2024; FAO, FSP & WFP, March 2024).

Malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery prevalence was high, especially in

Zambézia, Tete and Cabo Delgado, with cholera also present. Poor access to appropriate water and sanitation facilities, and conflict-damaged WASH infrastructure in the north, aggravated the spread of waterborne diseases (UNICEF, February 2024).

In most districts, vaccination coverage was suboptimal (30–60 percent), as was vitamin A supplementation (13 percent in Nicudala). Good service coverage by humanitarian providers facilitated early case finding and treatment for acute malnutrition in Eriti district and Cabo Delgado province. However, insecurity limited humanitarian access in the north (NRC, October 2024; FAO, FSP & WFP, March 2024).

 1 - Acceptable    2 - Alert    3 - Serious    4 - Critical    5 - Extremely Critical

 Not analysed    Inadequate evidence    MUAC



# Namibia

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Acute food insecurity deteriorated sharply due to the impacts of El Niño.

PEAK 2024/2025 (OCTOBER 2024–MARCH 2025)


 **1.3M** people or 41% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the October 2024–March 2025 lean season. Of them, around **0.1M** were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

This is almost double the number since the October 2023–March 2024 lean season and the highest in GRFC reporting on Namibia. Each of the country's 14 regions had more than 30 percent of its population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), the worst affected being Kunene, Kavango West, Kavango East and Zambezi.



Source: Namibia IPC TWG, September 2024.

## Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2019–2024/25



Source: Namibia IPC TWG.

**History of the food crisis** The magnitude and severity of this food crisis has increased since Namibia's first IPC analysis in 2019 due to dry spells, price shocks and high levels of unemployment. Since 2021, more than 25 percent of Namibia's population has faced high levels of acute food insecurity. The largest increase in these numbers was observed between 2023 and 2024.

## DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

 **Weather extremes** The country experienced the most severe drought conditions in decades between October 2023 and April 2024 due to El Niño. The prolonged dry spells and erratic rainfall negatively impacted crop-producing areas during the 2023/24 season, and limited pasture and water availability for livestock (IPC, September 2024). As a result, harvests and livestock body conditions were poor. The government declared a state of emergency in May 2024 due to the severity of the drought (ECHO, May 2024). Many households had depleted their food stocks by the start of the lean season in October and were market reliant amid high prices and low employment.

Despite the transition to La Niña, drier-than-normal conditions persisted through early February 2025, which negatively impacted 2025 crop production and rangeland conditions (WFP, March 2025).

 **Economic shocks** Food prices rose following the drought-induced crop losses (FAO, November 2024). Higher food import prices, particularly for commodities imported from South Africa, exacerbated rising domestic prices (FAO-GIEWS, October 2024). Lack of income and rising unemployment, which reached 33.4 percent in October 2024, also negatively affected household purchasing power (NSA, October 2024).

## DISPLACEMENT

 **6 500** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.


# United Republic of Tanzania (specific areas)

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The severity of the food crisis improved despite long dry spells.

PEAK 2024 (NOVEMBER 2023–APRIL 2024)


 **0.9M** people or 13% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 21 analysed districts of mainland United Republic of Tanzania. No populations were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The analysis coverage changed between 2023 and 2024, decreasing from 28 districts in 2023 to 21 districts in 2024. The latest analysis classified the northern districts of Longido and Monduli in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), and the remaining 19 in Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Although the number of people in IPC Phase 3 was lower than during the previous year's peak, the share of the population in this phase in 2024 rose from 10 to 13 percent, indicating increased severity in some overlapping areas.



Source: United Republic of Tanzania IPC TWG, December 2023.

## Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2017–2024/2024



Source: United Republic of Tanzania IPC TWG.

**History of the food crisis** A lower-middle-income country, the United Republic of Tanzania has been included as a food crisis in the GRFC for eight of the past nine years, primarily due to adverse weather conditions and pests. The magnitude and severity of the situation has varied each year along with the number of districts analysed, hindering a comprehensive assessment of how the food crisis has evolved over time.

## DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

 **Weather extremes** In the northern and eastern regions of the country, crop and livestock production declined due to prolonged dry spells and erratic rainfall that limited pasture and water availability during the 2022/23 production season. As a result, food availability and income opportunities for casual labourers working on farms were limited, which hindered food access into 2024 (IPC, December 2023).

In addition, in November and December 2023, heavy rains linked to El Niño triggered severe flooding and landslides in the northern districts, which led to the destruction of homes, crops and agricultural assets (IFRC, May 2024).

 **Economic shocks** Food prices declined seasonally with the Msimu harvest, but they remained higher than the five-year average – 7 percent for maize, 28 percent for rice and 45 percent for beans – due to high production and transport costs, limited supplies and export demand from neighbouring countries (WFP, June 2024).

 **Pests and diseases** Adverse weather conditions fostered the development of crop pests and livestock diseases that compounded production issues (FAO, July 2024).

## DISPLACEMENT

 **0.3M** refugees and asylum-seekers


Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The food crisis deteriorated sharply due to the impacts of the El Niño-induced drought on agricultural production and sharply increasing food prices.

### PEAK 2024/25 (OCTOBER 2024–MARCH 2025)

 **5.8M** people or 33% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity across 94 districts during the lean season. Of them, around **0.2M** were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The severe impact of the El Niño-induced drought on agriculture, water resources and the national economy prompted a major increase in analysis coverage – up from 9.1 million people in 76 districts in 2023/24 to 17.8 million in 94 districts in 2024/25 – and an almost threefold increase in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity since the previous year's peak. When considering the same 64 districts analysed in 2023 and 2024, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 1.8 million or 23 percent of the analysed population to 3.4 million or 40 percent.



Source: Zambia IPC TWG, October 2024.

### DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2024–2025

 **Weather extremes** Prolonged dry spells, erratic rainfall and above-average temperatures brought on by El Niño led to the driest agricultural season in over 40 years in Zambia, resulting in significant crop losses and increased livestock deaths (IPC, October 2024).

The President declared the drought a national disaster in February 2024, as it affected nearly 9 million people across 84 of the 116 districts in Zambia's Central, Copperbelt, Eastern, Lusaka, Northwestern, Southern and Western provinces (OCHA, May 2024). The 2023/24 season's domestic output of maize – a critical

staple crop – was 50 percent below the five-year average (FAO-GIEWS, October 2024). Many households in affected districts rely on agriculture and livestock as their main source of food and livelihoods, and, as a result, experienced consumption gaps (IPC, October 2024).

Below-average rainfall conditions through December 2024 have caused delays in the onset of the 2025 growing season (WFP, December 2024). La Niña is expected to bring wetter than normal conditions to southwestern Zambia through March 2025 (WFP, December 2024).

 **Pests and diseases** The drought created favourable conditions for the multiplication of fall armyworm, locusts and cassava brown streak disease, which negatively impacted seasonal crop performance in some provinces (IPC, October 2024).

 **Economic shocks** Reduced crop and livestock production placed upward pressure on already elevated food prices due to tighter food supply, increased reliance on food imports and greater demand as households depleted their food stocks early (IPC, October 2024). Maize prices were 40 percent higher year-on-year in September


(FAO-GIEWS, October 2024). The local currency depreciated by 21 percent relative to the US dollar between September 2023 and September 2024 (WFP, October 2024), pushing up the cost of imported agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer, and reducing the cultivable area.

### DISPLACEMENT

 **88 700** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

### Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2024/25



Source: Zambia IPC TWG.

**A protracted food crisis** A lower-middle-income country, Zambia has been included in all editions of the GRFC. This is largely due to the impact of weather extremes (frequent prolonged dry spells, extreme high temperatures and floods) on the food security and livelihoods of smallholder farming households who are responsible for up to 90 percent of food production and predominantly depend on rainfed agriculture. They also face limited access to high-quality inputs, climate and post-harvest management information, sustainable markets and financial services (WFP, 2024).



 At least 25% of households meet ≥50% of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

## ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | A worsening food crisis due to El Niño-induced drought coupled with macroeconomic instability.

### PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER–DECEMBER)

 **5.0M** people or 32% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season.

This is a major deterioration since the 2023 peak when 3.5 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity, mainly due to a very poor 2024 harvest.

Deficit-producing areas in the southern, eastern, western and extreme northern regions were of high concern, along with areas with a very poor harvest in Mashonaland provinces.



The Government of Zimbabwe did not support this analysis.

Source: FEWS NET, June 2024.

### PROJECTION 2025 (JANUARY–MARCH)\*

 Up to **6.0M\*\*** people or 38% of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity by the end of the lean season.

This marks a worsening situation from the end of 2024 up to the main harvest in April 2025. Household food stocks are expected to deplete early during the lean season, even in typical surplus-producing areas, while high prices and below-average income constrain access to markets.

\* The projection period differs from the period defined as peak in 2024.

\*\* This figure represents the upper bound of the 5–6 million range provided by FEWS NET.

Source: FEWS NET, October 2024.

### DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025



**Weather extremes** Due to El Niño, the 2023/24 rainy season was characterized by delayed onset and well below-average cumulative rainfall and multiple dry spells during a time that was critical for crop development (FAO, May 2024).

While these deficits were recorded throughout the country, the most extreme anomalies were in extreme northern areas. Parts of Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland West and Midlands provinces experienced the driest mid-January to March period on record (FEWS NET, October 2024).

Widespread drought-induced crop failures and low yields caused a 50 percent decline in the production of cereals compared with the five-year average (FAO, May 2024). A nationwide state of emergency was declared in April 2024 as a result of the drought.

Low rainfall amounts in November and December 2024 negatively impacted plantings and early crop development in key cereal-producing regions (FAO, March 2025). Starting in January 2025, rainfall improved due to La Niña, which is expected to boost 2025 crop prospects.

 **Economic shocks** Food prices were pushed higher throughout 2024 primarily due to monetary instability. The government introduced a new official currency (ZiG) in April 2024, which moderated inflationary pressures. However, the exchange rate continued to experience instability.

In September 2024, the widening gap between the official and parallel exchange rates led the government to devalue the ZiG by 40 percent vis-à-vis the US dollar (WFP, September 2024). This devaluation caused food prices to spike abruptly in October 2024, further complicating

the country's efforts to meet consumption needs (FAO/WFP, November 2024).

Production shortages due to the El Niño-induced drought also exacerbated food price inflation, as the country's cereal import needs nearly doubled for the 2024/25 marketing year (FAO-GIEWS, December 2024). The weak currency inflated import costs of cereals from South Africa, where wholesale white maize prices reached consecutive record highs in 2024.

The reduction in crop production also reduced income from food and cash crop sales as well as food supplies, which further eroded vulnerable households' purchasing power and constrained their ability to access food.

### DISPLACEMENT

 **22 400** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

### Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2022–2025



Source: FEWS NET.

**A protracted food crisis** A lower-middle-income country, Zimbabwe has been in all editions of the GRFC due to weather extremes and macroeconomic instability.

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity over the 2016–2021 period is not comparable with the 2022–2025 period because of differences in the assessment methodology. Over the 2022–2025 period, the magnitude of the crisis has steadily increased because of macroeconomic issues, hyperinflation and weather extremes.



